Iran’s Grand Realpolitik
Friends,
“The sooner we understand the Iranian paradox — who they are, what they want, how they want to both humble us and work with us — the sooner we’ll understand how to come to terms with the new Iranian superpower.”
In this newsletter, I reflect on the complex relationship between Iran and the United States, weaving together history, politics, and the deep-rooted psyche of the Iranian people. My perspective is shaped by my academic background in international relations at San Francisco State University, where I studied under some of the same professors as a young Mohammad Javad Zarif—who attended a generation before I did and would later become Iran's foreign minister. I have closely followed Iran’s rise for a quarter century, beginning with a 64-page dissertation on its foreign policy. From the first official talks after decades of isolation in 2007, I lay out Iran’s demands for recognition in Iraq and assurances against American interference. These demands are, on the surface, reasonable, but always entangled with deeper suspicions on both sides. The crux of the matter is not just about politics, but about fundamentally different worldviews. Iranians are shaped by millennia of history, ancient Zoroastrian beliefs, and a sense of perpetual struggle between good and evil, all of which color how they see themselves and the West.
Americans—viewed by Iranians as ahistorical and transactional—often misinterpret Iran’s actions and intentions. For Iranians, history is not just context, but destiny. They see themselves as heirs to a fallen empire, their national character forged by centuries of foreign interference: Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, and most recently, Western powers. This historical memory creates a duality: Iran as both a spiritual, justice-driven nation and a pragmatic, empire-seeking power.
Events like the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddeq—often cited as the root of Iranian resentment—are, in fact, just one episode in a much longer story of perceived Western betrayal. Iranians may invoke Mosaddeq as a grievance, but their ambitions today are more forward-looking. They are concerned with regional security, influence, and the assertion of Iran’s rightful place as a major power.
Iran’s leadership—both secular and clerical—is united by core interests: maintaining internal security, preserving regional influence (especially in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf), ensuring favorable oil prices and technology, and achieving recognition as an equal power in the international system. The desire to co-administer Islam’s holy sites and to be treated fairly, especially in comparison to Israel and other regional players, is a recurring theme.
Iran’s worldview is shaped by a blend of Islamic and pre-Islamic (Zoroastrian) ideas, particularly the concept of cosmic justice. Leaders like Ali Shariati infused Iran’s revolutionary ideology with a sense of mission: Iran must fight injustice everywhere, not just for itself, but as a religious and moral imperative. This is akin in spirit to America’s own manifest destiny and explains Iran’s willingness to endure hardship and resist foreign-imposed “modernity.”
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s historic apology, in the 1990s, for the Mosaddeq coup was an attempt at reconciliation that fell flat because it misunderstood the depth and complexity of Iranian grievances. The real drivers of Iranian policy, as I see it, are not past slights, but the pursuit of regional hegemony and security. Iran’s patience, pragmatism, and unity of purpose have allowed it to outmaneuver adversaries, often preferring slow, calculated moves over rash aggression.
There are six core Iranian interests: internal security (especially with regard to ethnic minorities), influence in Iraq, energy security, the creation of an Iranian “empire,” control or co-administration of Mecca, and recognition as an equal player. These are not maximalist or irrational goals, but meeting them would upend the regional balance of power. Iran’s demands in negotiations with both the West and regional rivals have often been surprisingly restrained, focusing on practical concerns rather than ideological wish lists.
Therefore, I propose nine negotiating points for a new chapter in U.S.-Iranian relations that would put an end to the current US-Iran war. These include mutual security guarantees, joint Gulf patrols, easing the embargo on Iran, acknowledging Iran’s role in Iraq and Afghanistan, basing Israeli-Palestinian peace on international law, integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese state, addressing the status of Mecca, placing all regional nuclear arms, including Israel’s, under international supervision, and creating an international mechanism for oil pricing.
Iran is the Middle East’s only enduring, rational actor. The U.S. should move beyond past grievances and ideological rigidity to engage with Iran pragmatically. Like the U.S. opening to China, engagement with Iran could reshape the region’s balance of power, counter Russia and China, and bring a measure of stability to the Middle East. Ultimately, we must recognize Iran’s legitimate interests—not as a concession, but as a path to peace and a new regional order.
In conclusion, if we fail to end the current US-Iran war and negotiate, there is a serious risk that Israel may turn to the so-called "Samson Option." This term describes Israel's potential use of its nuclear arsenal as a last resort, should it ever face an existential threat. Named after the biblical figure Samson—who brought down the temple on himself and his enemies—the Samson Option signals that, in the gravest circumstances, Israel might launch a massive nuclear strike. Such an action could target not only immediate adversaries, but possibly the broader region as well. The mere possibility of this scenario highlights how catastrophic the consequences of diplomatic failure could be. That is why negotiation is not only preferable; it is essential for both regional and global security.
In Solidarity,
Gamy Enriquez, MPA
